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Tradable permits are now widely used to control pollution. We investigate the
implications of setting up such a system in another area – population control –,
either domestically or at the global level. We ﬁrst generalize the framework with
both tradable procreation allowances and tradable procreation exemptions, in order
to tackle both over- and under-population problems. The implications of procre-
ation rights for income inequality and education are contrasted. We decompose
the scheme’s impact on redistribution into three eﬀects, one of them, the tradabil-
ity eﬀect, entails the following: with procreation exemptions or expensive enough
procreation allowances, redistribution beneﬁts the poor. In contrast, cheap pro-
creation allowances redistribute resources to the rich. As far as human capital is
concerned, natalist policy worsens the average education level of the next gener-
ation, while population control enhances it. If procreation rights are granted to
countries in proportion to existing fertility levels (grandfathering) instead of being
allocated equally, population control can be made even more redistributive. Our
exploratory analysis suggests that procreation entitlements oﬀer a promising tool to
control population without necessarily leading to problematic distributive impact,
especially at the global level.
Keywords: Tradable permits, Population control, Pronatalist policy, Income in-
equality, Diﬀerential fertility, Grandfathering.
JEL Classiﬁcation numbers: J13, E61, O40.
2Introduction
In many countries, a gap obtains between the actual fertility rate and what is perceived
as the optimal fertility rate. In some cases, fertility is deemed too high, typically out
of concern for the ability of our natural environment to cope with such an anthropic
pressure (climate change being a possible example) or for the capacity of the land to feed
and provide enough space to so many people (a motive present a.o. in China’s one-child
policy, see Greenhalgh (2003)). In other cases, the actual fertility is perceived as too
low. It can be due e.g. to the need to be numerous enough to support an endangered
cultural identity. In some cases, it is the relative size of the various cohorts coexisting in
a country that is at stake, a low fertility rate being one of the factors (together with an
even more signiﬁcant one: growing life expectancy) threatening the ﬁnancial viability of
our pension schemes and our health care systems. Other concerns about relative size of
diﬀerent groups within a population arise as well with respect to ethnic composition or
educational level, fertility and mortality rates diﬀering along such characteristics.
It remains an open question whether each of these grounds is legitimate, especially for
those giving a signiﬁcant importance to people’s freedom (not) to procreate. Philosophers
have actually shown that the very idea of an optimal population raises an even more
fundamental challenge: as soon as we ask “optimal for whom?”, it becomes clear that the
answer may end up remaining unstable since the very existence of the agent with regard
to whom we need to assess the beneﬁt is itself a choice variable.1 In the present paper,
we shall leave such questions aside, assuming that in a given territory at a given point
in time, it can be meaningful to aim at a fertility rate diﬀerent from the one expected
in the absence of any state intervention. Hence, assuming that a fertility target may be
deﬁned in a meaningful manner, we shall be concerned here with the means to reach such
a target.
In the presence of under-population, various measures have been proposed and adopted.
For example, at least in some contexts such as post WWII, one justiﬁcation for the in-
troduction of family beneﬁts was a pro-natalist one. Other measures include extensive
parental (paid or unpaid) leave schemes, parents-friendly workplaces or the public provi-
sion of day-care. Admittedly, such measures may be promoted for reasons other than a
concern for optimal fertility level, such as the need to promote gender equality, to guar-
antee equality among children, to encourage the ﬁdelity of one’s workers (in the speciﬁc
1The question of the optimal fertility rate is also present in the social choice literature, for two recent
contributions see Michel and Wigniolle (2006) and Golosov, Jones, and Tertilt (2004).
1case of family beneﬁts) or to defend the family as an institution. Yet, the pro-natalist
dimension is often present among such justiﬁcations - not to mention among the eﬀects
of such policies (Demeny 1987).
In contrast, whenever over-population obtains, there is a variety of measures available
to control population, ranging from information campaigns on contraception means, the
liberalization of abortion or the leveling up of women’s educational level, to China’s one-
child policy. The use of coercive anti-natalist means is problematic both because of the
extent to which it reduced people’s freedom (Sen 1996), but also because it threatens the
ability of such means to actually reach the goals that have been set.
Now, one measure that could serve both pro-natalist and anti-natalist purposes has never
been put in place so far: tradable procreation entitlements. Tradable quotas schemes have
been promoted as a policy tool for several decades. They have typically been proposed
and widely implemented to combat air pollution,2 overproduction (e.g. tradable milk
quotas in the EU), overexploitation of natural resources (e.g. individual transferable ﬁsh
quotas). It has also been proposed in other areas - while never being implemented - such
as inﬂation control (Lerner and Colander 1980), and, more recently, asylum policy (Schuck
(97) and Hathaway and Neve (1997)) or deﬁcit control (Casella 1999). The idea is always
to agree on a cap to reduce the extent of a given problem (over-production, over-inﬂation,
pollution, excessive unemployment,), to allocate the corresponding rights to the various
actors involved (states, ﬁrms and/or individuals), and to allow for tradability of such
rights between the actors, in order to take into account diﬀerences in marginal reduction
costs. One of the oldest of such proposals is Boulding (1964)’s idea of tradable procreation
licenses to combat overpopulation.
More than forty years later, population policy is searching for tools able to deal with
both over- and under-population, the latter being a more recent concern in developed
countries. In this paper, we ﬁrst apply the concept of tradable entitlements to population
control problems. We generalize the framework with both tradable procreation allowances
and tradable procreation exemptions, in order to tackle the two sides of the problem.
Second, we address two central concerns regarding such a scheme, namely distributive
and educational concerns. The former refers to the fact that such a scheme, especially
through its tradability component, would be detrimental to the poor. The latter, refers
to the interdependency of fertility and education choices. Third, we also investigate
2The 1990 Clean Air Act Amendments initiated the ﬁrst large-scaleuse of the tradable permit approach
to pollution control. The empirical analysis of Joskow, Schmalensee, and Bailey (1998) shows that the
emission rights market created in 1990 had become reasonably eﬃcient within four years.
2the implications of a global version of procreation entitlements, in line with comparable
attempts to ﬁght global warming (Kyoto agreement). While being inspired by earlier
proposals by authors such as Boulding or Tobin, this paper should certainly not be read
as an exercise in the history of economic ideas. It rather aims at exploring some of the
potentialities and shortcomings of the idea of tradable procreation entitlements, with the
view of proposing a new instrument of social policy to face one of today’s problems.
After reviewing the literature in Section 1, we describe our benchmark model with en-
dogenous fertility and education choice in Section 2. We introduce tradable procreation
allowances granted to households in Section 3. We also generalize the system to accom-
modate the reverse situation, when they are tradable procreation exemptions. We look at
how these rights modify the optimality conditions. Next we study the existence of equilib-
rium prices for these rights. We then look at whether tradability will impoverish the poor
further in Section 4. Consequences in terms of education are also analyzed. In Section 5,
we move from the country level to the global level. We illustrate how procreation rights
could modify the fertility levels across the world. We also study the redistributive impact
of an alternative allocation rule of procreation rights, granting rights in proportion to
existing fertility levels (grandfathering). Section 6 concludes.
1 Literature Review
Boulding’s Proposal
Since the middle of the 20th century there is a growing anxiety that our planet may not
be able to sustain an ever increasing population. In an attempt to address this issue,
Kenneth Boulding proposed (1964: 135-136):
I have only one positive suggestion to make, a proposal which now seems so
far-fetched that I ﬁnd it creates only amusement when I propose it. I think in
all seriousness, however, that a system of marketable licenses to have children
is the only one which will combine the minimum of social control necessary
to the solution to this problem with a maximum of individual liberty and
ethical choice. Each girl on approaching maturity would be presented with a
certiﬁcate which will entitle its owner to have, say, 2.2 children, or whatever
number would ensure a reproductive rate of one. The unit of these certiﬁcates
3might be the “deci-child,” and accumulation of ten of these units by purchase,
inheritance, or gift would permit a woman in maturity to have one legal child.
We would then set up a market in these units in which the rich and the
philoprogenitive would purchase them from the poor, the nuns, the maiden
aunts, and so on. The men perhaps could be left out of these arrangements,
as it is only the fertility of women which is strictly relevant to population
control. However, it may be found socially desirable to have them in the plan,
in which case all children both male and female would receive, say, eleven or
twelve deci-child certiﬁcates at birth or at maturity, and a woman could then
accumulate these through marriage.
This plan would have the traditional advantage of developing a long-run ten-
dency toward equality in income, for the rich would have many children and
become poor and the poor would have few children and become rich. The price
of the certiﬁcate would of course reﬂect the general desire in a society to have
children. Where the desire is very high the price would be bid up; where it was
low the price would also be low. Perhaps the ideal situation would be found
when the price was naturally zero, in which case those who wanted children
would have them without extra cost. If the price were very high the system
would probably have to be supplemented by some sort of grants to enable the
deserving but impecunious to have children, while cutting oﬀ the desires of
the less deserving through taxation. The sheer unfamiliarity of a scheme of
this kind makes it seem absurd at the moment. The fact that it seems absurd,
however, is merely a reﬂection of the total unwillingness of mankind to face
up to what is perhaps its most serious long-run problem.
Design issues
On top of a separate and short discussion by Tobin (1970) with no reference to Bould-
ing, Heer (1975) and Daly (1991,1993) discuss Boulding’s proposal. They both propose
amendments or complements to the scheme’s design. Such proposals essentially revolve
around four issues: the need for continuous adjustments of the birth rate target, the issue
of shifting up the reproduction age through the system, the problem of early mortality
and the deﬁnition of the license beneﬁciaries.
As to the ﬁrst issue, Heer suggests that the government (and not only the individual
permit users) could be allowed to buy such permits. A similar issue arises in the ﬁeld of
4pollution permits, where e.g. environmental NGOs, despite not being permit users, are
allowed to inﬂuence the global cap through buying permits. In the present case, Heer
identiﬁes two reasons why it may be worth allowing the government to be a permit buyer
as well. On one hand, in order to deal with the problem of partial non-compliance, the
government could buy on the market a number of permits corresponding with the number
of unlicensed babies (Heer, 1975: 4). On the other hand, in contrast with the case of
pollution permits, procreation rights are allocated for life rather than for a given period.
And other factors than birth rate aﬀect the size of a given population, most notably
mortality rate and geographical mobility (immigration/emigration). As Heer writes, “(...)
the original Boulding proposal guarantees only that fertility will vary narrowly around
replacement level and cannot guarantee that the rate of natural increase (the crude birth
rate minus the crude death rate) will be nil nor, a fortiori, can it provide for zero population
growth (which would be obtainable with a zero rate of natural increase only provided there
was also no net immigration from abroad)” (1975: 4). A government may thus want to
adjust the amount of birth licenses to the evolution of these other factors. One could
argue that allowing the government to buy permits all along would make it less necessary
to adjust the amount of permits allocated to each birth cohort.
Heer focuses on a second set of amendments aimed at inﬂuencing the birth rate through
raising the women’s age of reproduction. Two avenues are proposed, a incentive-based
one and a more standard one. As to the former, one could “allow for the possibility that
individuals, until they reached age 35, could loan their license units to the government and
receive interest during such time as their license units were on loan to the government”
(Heer, 1975: 6). There could thus be a ﬁnancial incentive to delay reproduction, which
would certainly have an impact on the birth rate. The other way in which Heer proposes to
inﬂuence the age of reproduction (hence indirectly the lifelong reproduction rate) consists
in “stipulating that licenses to bear children be granted only at age 18 and that individuals
under this age neither be allowed to purchase licenses nor to be given licenses by other
persons” (Heer, 1975: 8). The two avenues (loan and minimum age) are of course not
exclusive and could therefore be combined.
Child mortality is another concern for both Heer and Daly. They want to prevent the
system from disadvantaging (often poorer) parents experiencing child loss. This leads to
a third set of proposals. Heer proposes that “a woman losing a child before that child
reached its eighteen’s birthday would be given a suﬃcient number of license units to bear
an additional child; but if a child died after its eighteenth birthday, its mother would
5receive no additional units” (1975: 8). As to Daly, his approach to the issue of child
mortality implies both that licenses be granted at birth and that they be bequeathable.
This is such that “if a female dies before having a child, then her certiﬁcate becomes part
of her estate and is willed to someone else, for example, her parents, who either use it
to have another child or sell it to someone else” (1993: 336). If on top, permits were
allocated both to girls and boys (rather than to girls only), Daly’s allocation at birth
would oﬀer a solution to the problem of early mortality of both girls and boys, allowing
the parents to give birth to more than two children in such a case without having to buy
extra permits. What is clear from this is that the answer provided to the “beneﬁciary
deﬁnition” question has a clear impact on the ability of the scheme to address the “child
mortality” challenge.
Finally, who should receive the licenses: women only, men only, both men and women?
Boulding’s proposal - as well as Tobin’s - consists in a “ladies-only” allocation. For Heer,
the possible merits of a men-only scheme include “a considerable reduction in the incidence
of illegitimate births” (1975: 8) for reasons that are not entirely clear though. But other
reasons are suggested as possible grounds for granting them to women only, such as the
need for compensating the discriminations that women experience. In contrast, issues such
as whether single-sex allocation would not be discriminatory from a gender-orientation
perspective, or as to how to deal with the licenses in case of divorce once they are granted
to both parents, are not examined by these authors.
Distributive Impact
Besides these design issues, other problems are considered by the three authors. The three
most signiﬁcant ones are: the question of the scheme’s distributive impact, the problem
of enforcement, and the examination of alternative means to reach the same goal.
Regarding distributive impact, Daly, as Boulding, discusses the issue. He traces possible
injustices arising from the scheme back to background distributive injustices that are
present anyway. Not only does he claim that existing injustices will not be worsened by
the introduction of the scheme. He even argues that inequalities will be reduced, for two
reasons. First, the “new marketable asset is distributed equally” (336), which does not
tell us why this would reduce inequalities. Second, “as the rich have more children, their
family per capita incomes are lowered; as the poor have fewer children their family per
capita incomes increase. From the point of view of the children, there is something to
be said for increasing the probability that they will be born richer rather than poorer”
6(1993: 336). It is not clear of course why the richer would tend to have more children as
a result of the scheme. It is easier to understand why the poorer would tend to have less.
2 Benchmark Model
The salient feature of the benchmark economy in which we shall introduce procreation
entitlements consists in fertility and education choice by households belonging to diﬀerent
income groups. We consider a model inspired from de la Croix and Doepke (2003). They
propose a tractable framework where households are heterogeneous in terms of human
capital, and low-skilled households choose to have more children than skilled ones. This
theoretical set-up reﬂects the well-documented fact that fertility is inversely related to
the education level of the mother (Kremer and Chen 2002). Diﬀerential fertility will turn
to be a key element in the analysis of procreation entitlements. We ﬁrst present the
benchmark model without such entitlements.
The model economy is populated by overlapping generations of people who live for two
periods, childhood, and adulthood. Time is discrete and runs from 0 to ∞. All decisions
are made in the adult period of life. There are two types of agents, indexed by i, unskilled
(group i = A) and skilled (group i = B), who diﬀer only in their wage wi
t. The size of
each group is denoted Ni
t. Agents represent households within a country, but we will also
interpret them as countries within the global economy in Section 5. Adults care about
their own consumption ci
t, the number of their children ni
t, and the probability π(ei
t) that
their children will become skilled. This probability depends on the education ei
t they
receive. Preferences are represented by the following utility function:
ln[c
i





The parameter γ > 0 is the weight attached to children in the households’ objective.
Notice that parents care both about child quantity ni
t and quality π(ei
t). As we will see
below, the tradeoﬀ between quantity and quality of children is aﬀected by the human
capital endowment of the parents. Notice also that parents do not care about their
children utility, as it would be the case with dynastic altruism, but they care about their
future human capital.
To attain human capital, children have to be educated. Parents freely choose the education
spending per child ei
t. Apart from the education expenditure, raising one child also takes
7a constant fraction φ ∈ (0,1) of an adult’s time. This fraction of time cannot be cut
down. Therefore it limits to 1/φ the number of children one family can possibly raise.
Parents provide education to their children because it raises the probability that their
children will be skilled. Speciﬁcally, given education e, the probability πi(e) of becoming
skilled is given by:
π
i(e) = τ
i (θ + e)
η, η ∈ (0,1).
The parameter θ measures the education level reached by a child in the absence of edu-
cation spending by the parents. This education level is obtained for free and is a perfect
substitute to the education provided by the parents. η measures the elasticity of success
to total educational input θ+e. The parameter τi depends on the type i, and we assume
the children of skilled parents have, ceteris paribus, a greater chance of becoming skilled
themselves, i.e. τB > τA.3
The budget constraint for an adult with wage wi
















The aggregate production function for the consumption good is linear in both types of








The marginal product of each type of worker is constant and equal to ωA and ωB > ωA
respectively. The total input of the groups are given by LA
t and LB
t . The equilibrium
condition on both labor markets Ni
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t) = Li






Denoting the equilibrium outcome in the benchmark case with hatted variables, we end
up with the following deﬁnition:
Deﬁnition 1 (Equilibrium)
Given initial population sizes NA
0 and NB




t)i=A,B.t≥0 and group sizes ( ˆ Ni
t)i=A,B.t≥0 such that
3Note that, in what follows, e is always bounded from above; hence we can always deﬁne the constant
term τi as a function of the other parameters of the model such that the function πi() returns values in
the interval [0,1].
8• Consumption, education and fertility maximize households’ utility (1) subject to the
budget constraint (2);
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• Labor market clears, i.e.
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Let us now analyze the solution to the individual maximization problem. Parents face a
tradeoﬀ between the number of children they have, and the amount of goods they spend
on the education of each child. For, since productivity is ﬁxed, having more children
necessarily entails less spending per child. For educated parents, the opportunity cost of
child-rearing time is higher, they will prefer to invest in the education or “quality” of a
small number of children. For less educated parents, in contrast, the opportunity cost of
raising children is lower, while providing education is expensive relative to their income.
Parents with low income would therefore choose to have many children, but invest less in
the education of each child. This notion of a quantity-quality tradeoﬀ in the decisions on
children was ﬁrst introduced by Becker (1960) and is supported by empirical evidence on
the cross-sectional distribution of fertility and education. Maximizing utility (1) subject







(φw − θ)(1 + γ)
. (6)
otherwise,





This simple model displays the two important properties of quantity-quality tradeoﬀ mod-
els: ∂ˆ e/∂w ≥ 0, i.e. parental education spending increases in income, and ∂ˆ n/∂w ≤ 0,
9i.e. fertility decreases in income. Since income in this model reﬂects human capital, fer-
tility is a decreasing function of the human capital of the parents. Notice also the role of
parameter θ, which captures the education children receive for free (by nature or society).
A higher θ pushes parents to substitute education with number of children.
Observed income inequality ∆B (B for benchmark) can be measured by the diﬀerence
between high skilled and low skilled income:
∆
B = ω
B(1 − φˆ n
B) − ω
A(1 − φˆ n
A). (9)
This measure will be used later to assess the eﬀect of procreation rights on income dif-
ferences. In this respect it is worth emphasizing that the metric adopted in this paper
is income rather than utility diﬀerences. Moreover, we focus on diﬀerences in income, as
opposed to possible improvement or degradation of the income of the least well oﬀ.








The dynamic system (3) is reduced to a ﬁrst-order recurrence equation zt+1 = f(zt). In
Appendix A, we show that the function f(.) satisﬁes: f(0) > 0, f′(z) > 0, f′′(z) < 0.
The last two results are guaranteed by the fact that τB > τA. The dynamics of zt admit
a single positive steady state which is globally stable.
3 Implementing Tradable Procreation Rights
The government has a fertility objective of ν children per person. We do not question this
objective, but only impose the reasonable condition that it should be biologically feasible,
i.e.




The implementation sequence of procreation entitlements is detailed in Table 1. Let us
ﬁrst consider the sequence for allowances, which are designed to prevent fertility from
being above the target. At her majority, each parent receives for free4 ν procreation
4An alternative mode of initial allocation consists in an auction. The distributive impact of such an
alternative will depend to a large extent on the way in which the regulator will spend the hence collected
resources.
10Table 1: Implementation sequence
Allowances Exemptions
(price gt ≥ 0) (price qt ≥ 0)
At majority receives ν rights
At each birth cedes back one right if number births > ν
receives 1 right
At menopause if nt < ν < 0
gives back ν − nt rights
Over complete life Procreation and exemption rights can be sold and purchased
allowances from the Procreation Agency. We assume that each procreation allowance
corresponds with the right to give birth to one child. Each time she gives birth to a
child, a parent has to cede one procreation allowance back to the Procreation Agency.
Procreation rights can be sold and purchased at any moment in time at a price gt. We
assume that ﬁnes are such that everyone will be deterred from violating such rules at
equilibrium.5
We now consider the sequence for exemptions, which are designed to prevent fertility
from being below the target. Each time a parent gives birth to a child, and as soon as
observed parent’s fertility nt becomes larger than ν, she will receive free of charge from the
Procreation Agency one exemption right per additional child. At the standard menopausal
age, each parent having less biological children than ν has to give the Procreation Agency
ν − n exemptions, which she will have purchased on the procreation exemptions market
at a price qt ≥ 0. parents with more children than ν can sell on the market the un-used
exemptions.
Table 1 makes visible three speciﬁc properties of a tradable entitlement scheme aimed
at addressing a problem of under-provision. First, the exemptions are allocated ex post
facto rather than initially. Second, in comparison with taxation, our proposal exhibits
two properties. Not only is it quantity focused as opposed to price focused, but the joint
operation of allowances and exemptions guarantees that the target will strictly be met;
5Such ﬁnes will have to be targeted in such ways as not to aﬀect the children themselves. Otherwise
children would be sanctioned as a matter of fact for what they are not responsible for, see Dworkin (2000).
11in case of tradable exemptions, we see from the table that their amount is not limited
ex ante otherwise than through the biological constraint (nt ≤ 1/φ); in the absence of
an upper limit, reaching strictly the target cannot be guaranteed unless the system is
coupled with a tradable allowances scheme, which is the case here. Third, contrary to a
subsidy, the value of the exemption will ﬂuctuate as a function of market conditions.
In our model there is no child mortality or infertility risk. In a more general set-up, these
issues could addressed these issues by assuming a perfect insurance market which would
cover those risks.




















t − ν). (10)
The variable gt is the price of one procreation allowance, while qt is the price of one
procreation exemption. Since the two types of entitlements are put in operation simul-
taneously, only the diﬀerence gt − qt matters. We call this diﬀerence “procreation price”
and accordingly deﬁne
pt = gt − qt.
In equilibrium, pt can be positive or negative. Equilibria with positive procreation price
pt reﬂect situations where fertility is discouraged, while equilibria with pt negative obtain
in cases in which fertility is promoted. The following deﬁnition stresses that there is one
additional market compared to Deﬁnition 1.
Deﬁnition 2 (Equilibrium with Procreation Rights)
Given initial population sizes NA
0 and NB




t)i=A,B.t≥0, group sizes (Ni
t)i=A,B.t≥0, and prices (pt)t≥0 such that
• Consumption, education and fertility maximize households’ utility (1) subject to the
budget constraint (10);
• Group sizes evolve according to (3).
• Labor market clears, i.e. Equation (4) holds.






t = 0 (11)
12Fertility and Education Choices
In this section we drop the time index to save notation. A condition for the problem to
be well deﬁned requires the endowment of the household to be positive: w+pν > 0. This
condition will hold for all households if the equilibrium price satisfy:
ω
A + pν > 0. (C2)
This condition is always satisﬁed when fertility is discouraged (p > 0). When fertility
is promoted, condition (C2) imposes a lower bound on the price of procreation (i.e. an
upper bound on the price of exemptions). The condition implies that a poor household
wanting to have no children should be able to aﬀord it.
As in the benchmark model, the solution to the household decision problem can either be
interior, or at a corner. There is an additional diﬃculty compared to the problem without
procreation entitlements. If fertility is strongly encouraged by a negative procreation price
p, the biological constraint n ≤ 1/φ might be binding, i.e. some households may want
to have more children than what is biologically feasible.6 In Appendix B we characterize
the optimal solution. It appears that they are four diﬀerent regimes depending on the
procreation price and the income, which are:
• R1 Procreation price p is very negative and labor income w is low. The household
does not work and specializes entirely into the production of children. This repro-
ductive activity is so well paid that they can aﬀord to provide some education to
their children.
• R2 p is negative and w is low. The household entirely specializes into the production
of children, but is too poor to provide any education.
• R3 p is positive or moderately negative and w is low. The household has some
children, works, and doesn’t provide education. This corresponds to the corner
regime with no education that we already found in the model without procreation
rights.
• R4 p is positive or moderately negative but w is high. It corresponds to the interior
solution. It is obtained when the price of the procreation rights is not too low. If it
6In the benchmark model, the optimal n is always below the biological maximum 1/φ. Were this not
to be the case, households would have no income at all.
13was, either households would like to oﬀer no education at all to their children (the
constraint e ≥ 0 binds), or their economically optimal fertility would be above the
biological maximum (the constraint n ≤ 1/φ binds).
Obviously, regimes R1 and R2 are anecdotic because the procreation prices for which
they obtain are unrealistically negative7 but still need to be considered when studying
the general equilibrium with procreation rights. From the results in Appendix B, we can
establish the properties of fertility and education as a function of income and procreation
prices. Let us start with the eﬀect of income.
Proposition 1 (Fertility, Education and Income)
• For low income and low procreation price (regimes R1 and R2), small changes in
income neither aﬀect educational investment, nor inﬂuence fertility.
• For low income and high procreation price (R3), small changes in income inﬂuence
fertility negatively while leaving educational investment unaﬀected.
• For high level of income (R4), small changes in income aﬀect spending on educa-
tion positively. They also adversely inﬂuence fertility if and only if if the price of
procreation is low enough:
∂n
∂w




Proof: see Appendix B. ￿
This stresses that if p is below a threshold given by θ/(1−φν), the usual result that high
income parents have fewer children applies. If procreation is made suﬃciently expensive
through a positive price of procreation, then the usual pattern is reversed, and high income
parents have more children than poor parents. For the same procreation price, the cost
of children relative to total income is higher for the poor than for the rich. This feature
will have important implications when it comes to assessing the distributive impact of the
scheme.
Having assessed the impact of income on fertility for a given procreation price, we now
move to investigating the eﬀect of price changes on fertility rates. The following Propo-
sition summarizes the result.
7For such prices to occur at equilibrium, we would need a radical pro-natalist target.
14Figure 1: Fertility as a function of income and procreation price
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Proposition 2 (Fertility and Procreation Price)
The individual fertility rate n is a decreasing function of procreation prices p ∈ (−1/ν,+∞[.
Proof: see Appendix B. ￿
Proposition 2 reﬂects that the demand for the quantity of children decreases with the price
of children, i.e. children quantity is a non-Giﬀen good. Figure 1 represents an example
of fertility for the two groups A and B as a function of the procreation price. Starting
from the left hand side at a very negative price, the fertility rate of group A ﬁrst remains
constant as p increases because we still remain in the zone in which procreation price is
such that parents want more children than what their biological constraint allows (regimes
R1 and R2). At a certain point the price becomes such that fertility starts to decrease
(regime R3). We then observe a point at which the fertility function is non diﬀerentiable,
which corresponds to the shift from a regime with no education investment (R3) to the
one in which parents invest also in quality (R4). The fertility function of Group B is
diﬀerent as it shifts straight from the regime with maximum fertility (R1) to the interior
regime (R4).
As discussed above, as long as p remains below the threshold θ/(1 − φν) deﬁned in
15Proposition 1, the fertility rate of group A is equal to or greater than the fertility rate of
group B. In case p is large, however, the diﬀerential fertility is reversed.
Equilibrium
After having analyzed the eﬀect of procreation entitlements on individual behavior, it
now remains to be shown that there is procreation price such that actual average fertility
will meet the demographic target set by the government.
The property outlined above that households’ fertility rates are decreasing functions of the
procreation price implies that average fertility is also a decreasing function of p. Under
the condition that for the lowest possible negative price p (condition (C2)) all groups are
in regime R1, average fertility decreases from 1/φ for very low p to 0 for large positive
p. The continuity of the fertility function is then suﬃcient to establish the existence of
an equilibrium procreation price, which implies that the target fertility rate ν is reached.
The uniqueness of the equilibrium follows from the monotonicity of the fertility function.
Proposition 3 (Existence and Uniqueness of Equilibrium)
Deﬁne:
˜ p(w) ≡
θ(1 + γ) − (1 + ηγ)φw
γ(1 − (1 − η)φν) + 1
.
If ˜ p(ωB) > −1/ν the equilibrium procreation price exists and is unique.
Proof: See Appendix C. ￿
Besides the technical constraint ˜ p(ωB) > −1/ν, it follows that the structure of the econ-
omy as such will not impose constraints as to the possible level of the demographic target
ν. This does not preclude the possibility of constraints due to other reasons, such as
political feasibility or ethical reasons.



















Hence, on top of the diﬀerence in labor income one should take into account the transfer
which is generated by procreation rights p(nA − nB).
164 Eﬀects on Income Inequality and Education
In order to assess the distributive impact resulting from the introduction of a tradable
procreation scheme, it is helpful to ﬁrst look at a simpler case, which is the impact of
ﬁxed quotas.
Two Eﬀects of Fixed Quotas on Income Inequality
Examining the impact of tradable quotas schemes would not make much sense without
providing a comparison of such eﬀects with either those of a business-as-usual8 situation,
or those of alternative measures aimed at reaching the same demographic target. There
are two families of such alternative policy options. Either, we go for a measure that,
while being quantity-oriented as well, would be of a more rigid type, i.e. ﬁxed rather
than tradable quotas. Or, we go for a variety of price-oriented measures, such as family
allowances, free education,... (in case of underpopulation) or for taxation (in case of
overpopulation). In the case of price-oriented methods, potential parents are totally free
to chose the number of children they wish to have, under the pressure of incentives or
disincentives set up by regulatory authorities. Here, we only compare tradable quotas with
ﬁxed ones, both because this is the closest realistic alternative method, as the Chinese
example suggests, and because a comparison with price-oriented methods would require
a much richer analytic aparatus than the one we wish to rely upon here. Let us stress as
well the fact that when comparing ﬁxed and tradable quotas, we should assume the same
type of initial allocation (here: equality per head).9
Formally, ﬁxed quotas imposes an additional constraint n ≤ ν to the maximization prob-
lem studied in Section 2. If this constraint is tight for the skilled parents, i.e. if they would
otherwise have more children, it will also be tight a fortiori for the unskilled. Hence, the
constraint n ≤ ν is tight for both groups if and only if
ν ≤
(1 − η)γωB
(φωB − θ)(1 + γ)
= ˆ n
B,
The reverse situation where the government imposes a minimum fertility level can also
8Benchmark and business-as-usual are used indiﬀerently for the purpose of this paper.
9Notice that, in Chinese one child policy, the ﬁxed quotas are not uniformly distributed: two children
are allowed for in the countryside, only one in cities. This illustrates that the uniform allocation is not
the only possible option, and that allocations of quotas on the basis of other factors, such as existing
fertility levels, are also possible. This point is further developed in Section 5.
17be analyzed. In that case, the constraint is written n ≥ ν. It will be tight for the poor
and even more so for the rich if and only if
ν ≥
(1 − η)γωA
(φωA − θ)(1 + γ)
= ˆ n
A,
Hereinafter we only envisage the former case, dealing with over-population, unless speci-
ﬁed otherwise. The results we obtain apply mutatis mutandis to the policy dealing with
under-population.
Assuming tight constraints, the solution to the maximization problem is:
If w > θ/(γη(1/ν − φ)) [interior regime],
e =




In the interior regime, we have ∂e/∂ν < 0. This conﬁrms that as parents react to the
quantitative constraint by having less children, they will be able to aﬀord to spend more
on each of their children.
As to income inequality, the diﬀerence between high skilled and low skilled income, ∆F
(F for ﬁxed), is given by:
∆
F = ω
B(1 − φν) − ω
A(1 − φν). (13)
Comparing with Equation (12) of the tradable rights case, transfers do not obtain in this
case as a result of population policy.




= (ˆ n − ν)(ω
B − ω
A)




B − ˆ n) − ω
A(ˆ n
A − ˆ n)
      
diﬀerential fertility eﬀect<0
where ˆ n = (ˆ nA ˆ NA + ˆ nB ˆ NB)/( ˆ NA + ˆ NB) is average fertility in the benchmark case. The
ﬁrst eﬀect, labeled “diﬀerential productivity eﬀect” can be understood as follows. Let us
envisage a hypothetical business-as-usual situation in which high-income and low-income
18people have the same fertility level ˆ n. Assume that this level is higher than the one
required by our demographic target ν. With the introduction of non-tradable quotas the
extent to which the rich will procreate less than the poor is identical. Both the skilled
and the unskilled will increase their income as a result of the time made available by such
lower fertility. However, since the hourly wage (and underlying it, the productivity) of
the high-income is higher than the one of the low-income people, the income of the rich
will increase relatively more than the one of the poor. In short, the introduction of ﬁxed
quotas to ﬁght overpopulation in a world in which the fertility rate does not vary with
the level of income, will make the poor-income relatively poorer than the high-income.
The second eﬀect, labeled “diﬀerential fertility eﬀect” relaxes the assumption regarding
the absence of initial fertility diﬀerential (and it is equal to zero if ˆ nB = ˆ nA). In the
benchmark situation low-income people tend to have more children than high-income
people. Here, a second type of eﬀect can be singled out, of a redistributive rather than
of an anti-distributive nature. It can be explained as follows. If the ﬁxed quotas scheme
requires the same fertility level from the poor and the rich, the poor will have to reduce
her fertility level much more than the rich. As a result, she will also increase her working
time more than the rich. This eﬀect will reduce income inequality between the rich and
the poor, when compared with the income diﬀerential in the business-as-usual situation.
The sign of the total eﬀect of introducing ﬁxed quotas on income diﬀerence depends on
which of the two eﬀects dominates. One parameter aﬀecting the relative weight of the two
eﬀects is the elasticity of educational outcomes over investment in education, represented
by η. Indeed, computing the extreme hypothetical fertility rates of households with zero







w→∞ ˆ n =
γ(1 − η)
φ(1 + γ)







If this elasticity η is large, the fertility diﬀerential will tend to be large as well, to such
an extent that the “diﬀerential fertility eﬀect” may actually dominate the diﬀerential
productivity eﬀect. The reason underlying this connection between outcome-investment
19elasticity and fertility diﬀerential is the following. The poor is equally concerned about
education as the rich. However, for the poor, the cost of investing in education as well
as the opportunity cost of having children is lower than for the rich. A higher outcome
investment elasticity will not aﬀect the poor much, but will deﬁnitely push the rich the
substitute quality to quantity even more. Hence, the diﬀerential fertility is larger when η
is large.
Eﬀect of Tradability on Income Inequality
We now replace ﬁxed quotas with tradable quotas. In order to identify the diﬀerence it
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tradability eﬀect
(14)
Here, a third type of eﬀect obtains referred to as the tradability eﬀect and represented
through the expression p(nA − nB)/φ. Contrary to the two other eﬀects, its sign is
indeterminate. Depending on the price of the procreation entitlements, tradability will
either be redistributive (when p(nA − nB)/φ > 0) or anti-distributive (when p(nA −
nB)/φ < 0). The following proposition speciﬁes the conditions under which each case
occurs.
Proposition 4 (Redistributive Nature of Tradability)
Deﬁne ˆ p(w) ≡ (θ − ηφw)/η.
(i) If θ > 0, tradability is redistributive if and only if









(ii) If θ = 0 tradability is always redistributive.
Proof: See Appendix D. ￿
20Figure 2: Redistributive Nature of Tradability
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p < 0, nA > nB
Redistributive policy








21Figure 2 helps capturing the intuition underlying Proposition 4. When p is negative,
fertility is encouraged. Poor households have more children than the fertility target while
the rich have less. Poor people sell the exemptions they receive to the rich which reduces
the income gap between the rich and the poor. When p is positive and large, having
children is so expensive that rich people have more children than poor ones. This time,
the poor end up below the target and the rich above.10 Yet this is also redistributive
because poor people sell the procreation allowances they do not use to the rich (this is the
case imagined by Boulding). It is only when the procreation price is modestly positive that
tradability is anti-redistributive.11 In that case the price of allowances is not high enough
to bring the poor under the target, and therefore to reverse the fertility diﬀerential. Poor
households thus buy allowances from the rich and the income gap increases. Notice that
if θ is close to zero, this possibility disappears.
One important issue is whether practical indications can be provided as to whether an
actual scheme is likely to fall within the anti-redistributive zone identiﬁed in Figure 2.
There is at least one consideration that is relevant here. If we focus on the distributive
impact of tradability alone, if ν is lower but close to the existing fertility level, the price
of the procreation allowances will not be large enough and we are likely to fall within
the anti-redistributive zone. In other words, from the point of view of the tradability
eﬀect alone, the best guarantee for the scheme to have a distributive impact consists in
adopting a radical reform, i.e. one involving a ν that diverges enough from the existing
fertility rate. This is signiﬁcant as gradual reforms in this ﬁeld are more likely to be po-
litically feasible than radical ones. Two conclusions can be drawn from this. First, if we
take the tradability eﬀect alone as illustrated in Figure 2, schemes implementing the pro-
posed model are likely in practice to fall within the anti-redistributive zone, since radical
changes are less politically feasible. Second, whether this would tend to make the scheme
anti-redistributive all-things-considered does not necessarily follow as our discussion in
Section 5 will illustrate.
Eﬀects on Education
Let us now turn our attention to the eﬀect of procreation entitlements on education. This
is an important question because both social mobility and long-run income are positively
10At equilibrium the target is always equal to average fertility.
11This invites to look with a critical eye the widely shared view, also implied e.g. in Tobin (1970), that
tradability promotes by nature inequality.
22aﬀected by education spending. The following proposition shows how education depends
on procreation price.






Assume that the threshold ˙ p = min{˘ p, ˜ p(w)} < −1/ν. Investment in education e is
increasing in procreation price p.
Proof: From the expression for e given in Proposition 6. ￿
An increase in the procreation price reduces fertility (Proposition 2) and increases educa-
tion, which is the usual quantity-quality tradeoﬀ facing a rise in the cost of children. In
this case, natalist policy would be bad for education, social mobility and long-run income,
while population control would be good.12
One of the interesting eﬀects of a pro-natalist policy is intergenerational and illustrates as
well the interaction between the income and the educational impact of demographic poli-
cies. Let us consider two generations: P (parents) and C (children). And let us envisage
a population target such that the procreation price is negative. Such a pro-natalist policy
tends to reduce income inequalities within generation P due to the tradability eﬀect. How-
ever, this raises a serious diﬃculty. For the very same pro-natalist policy, while reducing
income inequalities within generation P, will also reduce the average level of education
(hence, the income level as well) of generation C. The pro-natalist subsidy is insuﬃcient
to compensate the income loss resulting from the fact that people with more children
tend to work less. This entails that they will earn less and have less money to invest in
education both in total and, a fortiori, per capita. In other words, a pro-natalist policy
will end up leading to a situation such that, while being redistributive for generation P, it
will tend to increase income inequalities between generations P and C. This is a problem
e.g. because we may then end up with a world in which the worst oﬀ people are worse oﬀ
than in the business-as-usual scenario (i.e. in the absence of pro-natalist policy). Does
this constitute a suﬃcient reason to reject the proposed scheme altogether? We do not
12A special but practically marginal case arises when p is extremely low and ˙ p > −1/ν. In such a case,
individual investment in education e is decreasing in p for p < ˙ p and increasing in p for p > ˙ p. Poor
households are in regime R1; they are entirely specialized into the production of children (n = 1/φ). A
small rise in p has no eﬀect on fertility, but has a negative income eﬀect, which entails that education
spending is reduced.
23think so. It rather stresses on the need to couple demographic policy with educational
policy. We could then both get the redistributive impact at the generation P level without
generating the negative impact on education (and income) for generation C. In practice,
this could take the form of education subsidies or publicly provided education.
5 Moving from National to Global Level
Procreation Entitlements at the Global Level
So far, we have assumed that tradable procreation permits were allocated at the domestic
level. There may however be good reasons to look at the way in which the scheme could be
applied to countries rather than to individuals. One such reasons is that those concerned
with the scheme at the domestic level because of moral objections to its enforcement, may
still be ready to accept that less coercive measures at the domestic level be combined with
a scheme of tradable procreation permits among countries. Moreover, those willing on
the contrary to promote the instrument domestically will generally be positively inclined
towards simultaneously implementing it at the global level. Another reason to look more
closely at a global version of the scheme is that one often cited mode of initial allocation,
i.e. grandfathering, could possibly make sense at the global level while being far less
plausible at the individual level.
Applied at the global level, the system would work along the same lines as a domestic one,
involving two key moments. First, a global demographic target should be set for a given
period. Second, we would need to decide about an initial allocation rule to distribute
the quotas to each of the countries. Let us ﬁrst consider a situation with a uniform
distribution of entitlements, which is the case analyzed so far. Understanding agents in
our model as countries or set of countries, all the results developed above can be applied
at the global level. In particular, the market for procreation entitlements will clear at
the equilibrium price, country speciﬁc fertility and education reacting as described by
Propositions 2 and 5. The eﬀect of tradability on income (gross national income here)
will depend on the condition set in Proposition 4.
Numerical Illustration
To illustrate how our set-up would operate at the global level, a version of the model
with a large number of agents (countries) will be solved numerically. In order to associate
24numerical values to our parameters η, φ; θ, and γ, we ﬁrst calibrate the benchmark
case of Section 2 on a cross-section of countries. Next we simulate the introduction of
procreation entitlements aiming at reducing the global fertility rate. Results could easily
be generalized to the reverse situation of under-population.
Calibration
One period in the model lasts 25 years. The variables are measured with data from
the World Development Indicators, averaging those available for the years 1998-2002.
Variable n is computed as the net reproduction rate, i.e. “Fertility rate, total (births
per woman)” divided by two in order to obtain a fertility rate per person and multiplied
by (1− “Mortality rate, infant (per 1,000 live births)”/1000) to measure net fertility per
capita. Total education θ+e corresponds to the product of “Adjusted savings: education
expenditure (% of GNI)” and “GNI per capita, PPP (current international $)” loading
to a measure of education spending per capita in PPP dollars. Population size N for
each country is proportional to the population aged 15-64. Productivity per person ω is
unobservable but can be obtained from Gross National Income y as follows:
y = ω(1 − φn/25). (15)
We then estimate by Full Information Maximum Likelihood the parameters φ, θ, η and
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The estimation results are presented in Table 2. The point estimate for the parameter
η, which measures the elasticity of income to schooling, is located well within the range
of estimates of the elasticity of earnings with respect to schooling (see the discussion in
de la Croix and Doepke (2003)). The estimated value for φ implies that one child takes
25Table 2: Estimation results
Number of observations = 158
Log likelihood = -1210.94
Standard
Parameter Estimate Error t-statistic P-value
η 0.578 0.0356 16.25 [.000]
φ 0.039 0.0057 6.798 [.000]
θ 43.18 4.9365 8.748 [.000]
γ 0.107 0.0127 8.432 [.000]
Equation education fertility
R-squared 0.88 0.50
4% of available time during 25 years.
Relationships (16)-(17) are presented in Figure 3. The curves stand for two theoretical
relationships: the productivity-fertility one (left panel), and the productivity-education
one (right panel). Points correspond to countries. Notice that we provide an estimation
of the productivity level below which no education takes place e = 0. It is equal to
θ/(φη) = 1915 dollars per person and per year. The curves ﬁt well with R-squared of 0.88
and 0.50 respectively. This is especially so when we consider the small number of degrees
of freedom allowed for by the model.
Simulation
Having estimated the parameters of the benchmark model, let us introduce procreation
entitlements and compute how fertility and education react to the imposition of a fertility
target in the various countries. The average fertility rate (per person) in the benchmark
is equal to 1.38; we consider two cases, one with a target ν = 1 and another with ν = 1.2.
We calculate the equilibrium procreation price by simulating the equilibrium deﬁned in
Deﬁnition 2. Prices pt ensuring that average fertility matches the target amount respec-
tively to 55.87 for ν = 1 and to 21.44 for ν = 1.2. Figure 4 shows how procreation
allowances modify fertility and education in each country. More speciﬁcally, we observe
that in the case of a moderate population control policy (ν = 1.2) fertility drops in poor
countries, while the overall correlation between fertility and income remains broadly neg-
ative. The drop in fertility allows for a rise in education spending, especially for countries
which were close to the threshold income. Education remains close to its former level
26Figure 3: Estimated relationships










































































for both the very poor and the non-poor countries. With a stronger population control
policy (ν = 1), fertility drops proportionally more in poor countries. Moreover, the overall
relation between fertility and income is now positively sloped. Education spending now
increases for all the poor countries.
The redistributive eﬀects of the two policies are displayed in Figure 5. For each country,
we compute the diﬀerence in GDP per head between the simulation with population
control and the benchmark. This comparison is directly in line with our analysis of
income redistribution of the previous sections. We observe that all countries gain from
population control policies. This is because the reduction in fertility cuts the cost of
having children supported by the economy (here it consists only of the time-cost φ) and
all countries end with a higher income. We also observe in the Figure that poor countries
gain more than rich countries, in particular in the simulation with a strong population
control. Hence, the diﬀerential fertility eﬀect outlined above dominates the other eﬀects.
Population control is thus redistributive.
To evaluate the gains from tradability, let us compare the equilibrium values of the pro-
creation price to the threshold of Proposition 4 θ/(1 − φν) = 44.93. Recall that if pt is
between 0 and this threshold, tradability is anti-redistributive. In the moderate policy
scenario, pt = 21.44 < 44.93, and tradability is anti-redistributive. In contrast, under the
strong policy scenario, pt = 55.87 > 44.93, tradability is redistributive. This application
of the result of Proposition 4 is conﬁrmed by the right panel of Figure 5 which displays
27Figure 4: Simulation results














































































the part of total gains in GDP that traceable to the tradability eﬀect.
Procreation Rights with Grandfathering
In the previous section, we asked ourselves whether a tradable procreation entitlements
would necessarily have an anti-redistributive impact. The underlying intuition was that
because of tradability, the wealthiest countries would be able to further increase the gap
separating them from poorer countries. Our model demonstrates however that there is
only one area in Figure 2 in which such anti-redistributive eﬀects arise. Outside this zone,
the scheme would rather have a redistributive impact. The key practical question was
then be to identify where practical schemes envisaged in speciﬁc real-life circumstances
would be located. The simulations of the previous section have shown that for a moderate
population control policy, we may end in this anti-redistributive zone, while for stronger
policies, it is more unlikely to be the case. In this section, we have a closer look at still
another theoretical option that could have diﬀerent distributive properties. Rather than
implementing an equal per capita initial allocation of procreation quotas, we would do so
on a grandfathering basis.
Grandfathering is a concept that originates from the late 19th century in the southern
US states (see Rose (1906)). It consists in an attempt at further delaying the electoral
enfranchisement of black people. As the franchise was formally broadened, extending
to both white and black men, the introduction of poll tax and/or literacy requirements
28Figure 5: Income gains









































was supposed to slow down the access of most black people to the suﬀrage. It was also
excluding some white men however, which arouse concern in the white community. This
led to the introduction of the so-called “grandfather clause” in the electoral regime of some
of the southern US states, stating that those whose grandfather or father was already
enfranchised would be exempted from poll tax and/or literacy requirements. In practice,
this meant that all white males would have the right to vote while still preserving the
exclusion of most black males through poll tax and/or literacy requirements, from which
they could not be exempted since none had had a grandfather entitled to vote.
By extension, the idea of grandfathering usually refers nowadays to the exemption from
new regulation granted on a temporary basis to actors already involved in a given activity.
More interestingly for us, it is used in the tradable emission permits context (such as the
Kyoto context, see Bohringer and Lange (2005) and Gosseries (2005)) to refer to one
mode of initial permits allocation, i.e. one that grants relatively larger shares of emission
rights to those who already emit relatively more. This means that when facing a global
emission reduction target, larger polluters will have to reduce their emissions in the same
proportion as lesser polluters. This means that the larger polluters are partly exempted
from the application of the new rule (relative exemption).
In the pollution reduction case, grandfathering can prima facie be expected to lead to
anti-redistributive consequences when compared to an equal per capita allocation. For
larger per capita polluters are also generally richer countries. In the procreation case, the
29relationship between fertility rate and wealth is not so straightforward and might actually
be the reverse. This suggests that grandfathering in the case of tradable procreation
entitlements could well have a distributive impact that diﬀers both from the one exhibited
in the case of grandfathering for tradable emission quotas and from the one unveiled in
the previous section for tradable procreation entitlements allocated on a per capita basis.
We now provide the analysis needed for the latter comparison.
We assume that countries receive an initial endowment of rights proportional to their
fertility rate in the absence of procreation rights (benchmark):13
ν
i = µ n
i |p=0 .
Parameter µ, when larger than one, indicates a pronatalist policy. Conversely, if µ is
lower than one, population policy is restrictive. The previously deﬁned average fertility
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where fertility levels with a tilde denote fertility in the grandfathering case. Computing
the diﬀerence in income gap between the benchmark case and the grandfathering one, we
13This is standardly done in practice for pollution rights. By referring to a base year preceding the
conception of the scheme, we avoid the moral hazard problem consisting in trying to manipulate one’s
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grandfathering eﬀect
(18)
where the hatted variables represent fertility in case of grandfathering.
We can compare this expression with the one in equation (14). The diﬀerential produc-
tivity eﬀect is unchanged. The diﬀerential fertility eﬀect and the tradability eﬀect have
the same form as before, but nA and nB in (14) are now replace by ˜ nA and ˜ nB in (18).
The two latter eﬀects would play the same role as before provided that fertility behavior
is only marginally altered by grandfathering. A fourth eﬀect is the grandfathering eﬀect.
Since the poor country initially received more procreation rights per head than the rich
one, an income transfer from the rich to the poor obtains in exchange for extra entitle-
ments in case of positive procreation price. The direction of transfer is reversed in case
of negative procreation price.
We still need to evaluate whether grandfathering modiﬁes the fertility behavior in a quan-
titatively signiﬁcant way. From numerical simulations carried on in our global model it
appears that the diﬀerence in fertility levels between the model with equal allocation of
rights and the one with grandfathering is very small, typically lower than three percentage
points for any country. Investment in education also remains almost unchanged. Equi-
librium procreation price are not much aﬀected either, with pt = 56.30 instead of 55.87
for the radical policy (ν = 1) and pt = 21.66 instead of 21.44 for the moderate policy
(ν = 1.2). The reason for these negligible eﬀects on behaviors and equilibrium prices is
that grandfathering acts as a lump-sum transfer (it is independent from eﬀective bahav-
ior) generating only a small income eﬀect, without any direct distortion on the price of
procreation.
We conclude from this that the essential diﬀerence between (18) and (14) is the last eﬀect,
which is a pure transfer. Grandfathering has a redistributive eﬀect in the case of popu-
lation control, simply by implementing a redistributive initial allocation of rights. While
31its eﬀect on fertility distribution is small, simulations show the eﬀect of grandfathering
on income distribution can be large, increasing by 50% the gains in GDP for the poor
countries compared to a system with a uniform allocation of rights.
6 Conclusion
In this paper, we explored the idea of tradable procreation entitlements, within a gen-
eral equilibrium model with endogenous fertility. Both tradable allowances and tradable
exemptions were envisaged, aimed at addressing problems of respectively over- and under-
population. An equilibrium with such assets exists. It can thus implement any desired
growth rate of population. Having shown this, we focus on worries as to the possible anti-
redistributive nature of such a scheme, as well as to possibly adverse impacts in terms of
educational investments.
Three eﬀects are identiﬁed and contrasted. While two of them also obtain in the case of
ﬁxed quotas schemes, a third one, the tradability eﬀect, is speciﬁc to the present scheme.
Insofar as income distribution is concerned, with procreation exemptions (whatever their
price) or allowances if they are expensive enough, tradability redistributes resources from
the rich to the poor. In contrast, cheap procreation allowances redistribute resources
towards the rich. Since high prices are likely to obtain only if fertility target departs
signiﬁcantly from the benchmark demographic scenario and since radical reforms are
politically more diﬃcult to defend than moderate ones, the risk of an anti-distributive
impact of the scheme is likely in case of initial allocation that would be equal per head.
As far as human capital is concerned, natalist policy would tend to reduce the average
educational level of the next generation, while population control would increase it. In case
of pro-natalist policies, sustaining education through additional measures may turn out to
be helpful for future generations. Restricting ourselves to natalist policy, negative eﬀects
on the level of education should not necessarily be seen as reasons to reject the proposal
altogether. Rather, it requires that the scheme itself be either modiﬁed accordingly (e.g.
through changes in the initial allocation of permits) or complemented by other schemes
aimed at countering such eﬀects.
We next consider the global level by applying our model to countries, rather than to
individuals, avoiding some of the enforcement diﬃculties involved in the domestic forms
of such schemes. Feeding our model with real data from 158 countries we show how a
32global population control policy with tradable entitlements can reduce fertility in poor
countries and enhance education. We also indicate to what extent an alternative allocation
rule of procreation entitlements, granting rights in proportion to existing fertility levels
(grandfathering) rather than on a per capita basis, can make population control even
more redistributive.
Let us conclude by pointing at two interesting diﬀerences with tradable pollution quotas.
First, population control is a two-sided problem, which requires the use of two types of
entitlements, exemptions and allowances. Their joint operation guarantees that any target
can be met. Second, while the rich tend to pollute more than the more, the poor tend to
have more children than the rich. As a result, grandfathering is not always detrimental
to the poor, as insights from environmental economics may suggest.
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35A Dynamics in the benchmark case
Dynamics are described by:
zt+1 =
nA(1 − πA)zt + nB(1 − πB)
nAπAzt + nBπB ≡ f(zt).











(nAπAz + nBπB)3 < 0
The dynamics of zt admit a single positive steady state:
z =
nA(1 − πA) − nBπB 
(nBπB − nA(1 − πA))2 + 4nAπAnB(1 − πB)
2nAπA ,
which is globally stable thanks to the properties of f(.).
Long-run income per capita is given by
Y
NA + NB =
ωANA(1 − φnA) + ωBNB(1 − φnB)
NA + NB =
ωAz(1 − φnA) + ωB(1 − φnB)
z + 1
,
and is a negative function of long-run z.
B Solution to the Household Maximization Problem
We study the following Kuhn-Tucker problem:
max
c,e,n
{ln[c] + γ ln[n] + γη ln[θ + e];w(1 − φn) − ne + p(ν − n) ≥ c ≥ 0,1/φ ≥ n,e ≥ 0}
It is obvious from the properties of the utility function (non satiety and u′(0) = +∞) that
optimal consumption is positive and that the budget constraint holds with equality; we




{ln[w(1 − φn) − ne + p(ν − n)] + γ ln[n] + γηln[θ + e];1/φ ≥ n,e ≥ 0}
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The ﬁrst-four equations deﬁne a system that we can solve for (a,b,n,e). There are four
solutions:
b =
φ((1 + γ)θ − w(1 + γη)φ − p(1 + γ − γ (1 − η)νφ))
θ − p(1 − νφ)
, a = 0,
e =







φ(wφ + p(1 + γ(1 − νφ)))
p(1 − νφ)


















, e = 0, n =
γ (w + pν)
(1 + γ)(p + wφ)
(21)
b =0, a = 0, e =
η(p + wφ) − θ
1 − η
, n =
γ (1 − η)(w + pν)
(1 + γ)(p − θ + wφ)
(22)
From these equations we can fully characterize the solution to the individual problem.
Proposition 6 (Solution to the Individual Problem) Deﬁne the following thresh-






θ(1 + γ) − (1 + ηγ)φw










Assume that (C1) and (C2) hold.
R1 If p < ˘ p and p < ˜ p(w), n = 1/φ, and
e =
−γη(1 + φν)p − θ
1 + γη
> 0. (27)
R2 If p > ˘ p and p < ¯ p(w), e = 0 and n = 1/φ.
R3 If p < ˆ p(w) and p > ¯ p(w), e = 0 and
n =
γ(w + νp)





R4 If p > ˆ p(w) and p > ˜ p(w),
e =
ηφw − θ + ηp
1 − η
> 0, and: (29)
n =
(1 − η)γ(w + νp)





The function ˆ p(w) is obtained by solving for p the condition e = 0 in Equation (22) or
the condition a = 0 in Equation (21). The function ˜ p(w) is obtained by solving for p the
condition n = 1/φ in Equation (22) or the condition b = 0 in Equation (19). The function
¯ p(w) is obtained by solving for p the condition b = 0 in Equation (20) or the condition
n = 1/φ in Equation (21). The threshold ˘ p is obtained by solving for p the condition
a = 0 in Equation (20) or the condition e = 0 in Equation (19).
The threshold procreation prices deﬁned in Proposition 6 display two interesting proper-
38ties. First, we can unambiguously rank them when the wage is equal to zero:
ˆ p(0) > ˜ p(0) > ¯ p(0) = 0 > ˘ p.
Second, they all intersect at the same point:
at w
⋆ =
θ(1 + γ(1 − φν))
γηφ(1 − φν)
, ˆ p(w
⋆) = ˜ p(w
⋆) = ¯ p(w
⋆) = ˘ p.
We represent these four lines and the corresponding regimes R1 to R4 in Figure 6. Let
us now consider a household with wage w. Starting from a very high price p, the solution
will be in regime R4. Letting the price drop, and abstracting from the constraint (C2),
two situations can arise. If w < w⋆, the succession of regimes will follow R4 → R3 → R2
→ R1 as prices drop; if w ≥ w⋆, we will pass from R4 to R1 directly. When we take into
account the constraint (C2), regime R1 will never be a possible outcome for households
with a very high wage.
All claims in Corollary1 are a direct consequence of the results of Proposition 6. From
Equation (30), ∂n/∂w = −γ(1 − η)(θ − p(1 − φν))/[(1 + γ)(p − θ + φw)2].








C Proof of Proposition 3
If ˜ p(ωB) > −1/ν, both fertility levels tend to 1/φ when p approaches −1/ν. Hence, for p
going from −1/ν to +∞, total fertility (NAnA +NBnB)/(NA + NB) goes monotonically













t ) = ν ∈]0,1/φ[,
which is the equilibrium price satisfying equation (11). This price is unique because
fertility is a monotonous function of p.
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w⋆
D Proof of Proposition 4







(i) To analyze the sign of M, we should consider the diﬀerent possible regimes. From
Figure 6, if the poor is in R1, the rich can be either in R1 or in R4. If the poor is in R2,
the rich can be in R2, R3 or in R4. If the poor is in R3, the rich can be in R3 or R4. If
the poor is in the interior regime R4, the rich is in R4 too. We thus have eight situations
to consider.
Cases were both types of households are either in R1 or in R2 are excluded by assumption
40(C1). Indeed, in that case, aggregate fertility per person would be 1/φ and the equilibrium
condition (11) would be violated. This leaves us with six diﬀerent cases.
When the poor is in R2, the procreation price is necessarily negative, and nA = 1/φ > nB.
When both individuals are in R3, the procreation price can be either positive or negative,
but we always have nA > nB because fertility decreases in income in regime R3. Hence,
p < 0 → M < 0 in this regime. When the poor is in R3 and the rich in R4, we also always
have nA > nB (compare (28) to (30)), which implies in this regime p < 0 ↔ M < 0.
Finally, if both individuals are in the interior regime R4, we can use Proposition 1 to
infer that if p < 0 (nA > nB) or if p > θ
1−φν (nB > nA), then M < 0. The min term in
the condition of the proposition gathers the requirement of being in regime R4 with the
condition of Proposition 1.









is negative and the condition in (i) is always true.
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